The Impact of Privacy Legislation on the Workplace: The New Zealand Experience by Roth, Paul
THE IMPACT OF PRIVACY LEGISLATION ON THE WORKPLACE: 
THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 
Paul Roth 
Faculty of Law 
University of Otago 
Abstract 
This paper describes how New Zealand 's Privacy Act applies in practice to the workplace. and what its effect has been 
in relation to the protection of workers· privacy interests. While there are a few areas where the legislation is effective. 
it has been largely a disappointment for workers. who are increasingly subject to privacy-intrusive practices in the 
workplace. 
Individuals· interests have always tended to be overridden in institutional and contractual settings where individuals 
lack bargaining power. The main argument of this paper is that New Zealand's Privacy Act. now in force for over 
eleven years. has hardly affec/ed I he balance of power in relation to workplace privacy matters. The irony is that those 
who are best placed 10 lake advantage of the legis/a/ion in the employment setting are unsuccessful job applicants and 
dismissed employees; ie those who are no/ ac/ually in a subsisting employment relationship. Despite the existence of 
privacy legislation, it is employmenl law that remains of paramount importance for the proteclion of workers· privacy 
interests. 
The New Zealand experience suggests that effective workplace privacy protection can only be attained through spec!fic 
sec/oral regulation 1ha1 overrides managerial prerogative and the ability of workers to contract out or their rights. 
Introduction 
Privacy interests raise important and often difficult issues 
in the workplace. As might be expected in an institutional 
setting, the individual as job applicant or employee tends 
to be in a position of relative weakness in relation to an 
employer who wants to acquire or use information. While 
individuals may in law consent to intrusions into their 
personal sphere, it is usually because refusal is not an 
option. In these times when the success of a growing 
service industry sector and the exa ltation of 
professionalism rests on a foundation of public image, 1 
and technological developments have opened up new 
possibilities in the way we work and the ways in which 
workers can be monitored both on and off the job, the 
importance of regulating employer control over the 
conduct and private li ves of workers has never been 
greater. 
Privacy legislation covering both the public and private 
sectors has now been in force in New Zealand for just 
over a decade. The aim of this paper is to describe how 
New Zealand's Privacy Act 1993 applies in practice to the 
workplace, and what its strengths and weaknesses have 
been in respect to protecting the privacy interests of 
workers. While there are a few areas where the legislation 
is effective, it has been largely a disappointment for 
workers, who are increasingly subjected to privacy-
intrusive practices in the workplace as in other spheres of 
their dai ly lives. 
Ind iv iduals' interests have always tended to be 
overridden in institutional and contractual settings where 
the parties are not positioned on a level playing field. The 
main argument in thi s paper is that New Zealand's 
Privacy Act has hardly affected the balance of power in 
relation to workplace privacy matters. The irony is that 
those who are best placed to take advantage of the 
legislation in the employment setting are unsuccessful job 
applicants and dismissed employees -- that is, people who 
are not actually in a subsisting employment relationship 
at all. Moreover, despite the ex istencc of privacy 
legislation, it is employment law that remains of 
paramount importance for the protection of workers' 
privacy interests. The New Zealand experience suggests 
that effecti ve workplace privacy protection can be 
attained only through specific sectoral legislat ion that 
overrides managerial prerogati ve and the abi lity of 
workers to contract out of their rights. 
The Priva(_)' Act 1993 
The ccnterpiece of the Privacy Act is the set of 
information pri vacy principles in s 6 that govern the 
collection, holding and use of personal information. In 
relation to the employment setting, they may be 
summarised as follows: 
• personal information can only be collected if it is 
necessa ry to do so for a function or activity of an 
agency (principle I); 
• personal information should normally be 
co llected directly from the individual concerned 
unless otherwise authorised (principle 2); 




where information is collected directly from 
individuals, they should be made aware that it is 
being collected and for what purpose, and who 
will hold or receive it (principle 3); 
personal information should be collected by 
lawful means and not in an unfair or 
unreasonably intrusive manner (principle 4 ); 
personal information should be protected by 
adequate security measures (principle 5); 
• individuals have rights of access to and 
correction of their personal information 
(principles 6 and 7); 
• agencies should not use personal information 
unless it has been checked for accuracy and 
relevance in relation to its intended purpose 
(principle 8); 
• agencies should not retain personal infonnation 
for longer than they may lawfully use it 
(principle 9); 
• agencies must not use or disc lose personal 
information for any purpose other than that for 
which it was collected unless authorised 
(principles I 0 and I I): 
Some of the principles that might be expected to be 
important for privacy protection in the workplace allow 
for derogations. so that, for example, individuals can 
waive their application (principles 2, 3, I 0, and 11 ). The 
benefit of protection by the other principles cannot by 
waived or contracted out of by individuals. Therefore, it 
is these non-dcrogablc principles that should have the 
strongest effect in the workplace and other settings where 
the inJividuol proceeds from a position of relative 
weakness. The principles. however, are framed 
somewhat loosely, and are subject to many exceptions. 
An important feature of the legislation is that a breach of 
a principle on its own does not general ly lead to liability. 
Except in the case of denied access or correction rights, 
the breach of a privacy principle must be accompanied by 
some loss or harm, and in the case of emot ional harm, 
there must be "significant humiliation, significant loss of 
Jignity. or significant injury to feelings" (s 66( I )(b)(iii)). 
This functions as the main sifting mechanism of the 
legislation. to filter out complaints of a minor nature. 
The Privacy Commissioner oversees compliance with the 
Act and plays an important role in investigating and 
conciliating complaints. The Privacy Commissioner's 
views, however, arc not legally binding. 2 Only the 
lluman Rights Review Tribunal can determine legal 
issues at first instance. but it cannot do so unless the 
Privacy Commissioner has first dealt with the complaint. 
I r a complaint has not been resolved by the Privacy 
Commissioner. it can be taken to the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal by the Director of Human Rights 
Proceedings if it is appropria te to do so, or else by the 
aggrieved individual. 
Collection of personal information 
Pre-employment inquiries 
Without some legal protection, job applicants are 
ordinarily not in a position to refuse to disclose 
information requested by an employer or employment 
agency. Most jurisdictions now provide remedies for 
discriminatory hiring practices in their human rights 
legislation, and New Zealand is no different in that 
) 
respect. 
The Privacy Act provides limited protection in relation to 
pre-employment inquiries. Principle I ("Purpose of 
collection of personal information") is non-derogable and 
requi res that a collection of personal information must be 
for a lawful purpose connected with a function or activity 
of the agency, and that the collection is necessary for that 
purpose. Since collecting information for the purposes of 
discrimination is unlawful, principle 1 supplements 
existing human rights protections in that regard. 
For example, in the employment law case of Attwood v 
Imperial Jndustries, 4 the Employment Relations 
Authority found that an employer's pre-employment form 
was drawn too widely and therefore was likely to have 
breached principle I. The employee had been dismissed 
because she allegedly misrepresented her medical 
condition on the form when she applied for a sales 
position. The Authority, however, determined that the 
applicant 's fai lure to refer to two pre-existing medical 
conditions on the form did not amount to 
misrepresentation because the employer was not entitled 
to collect this information in the first place because of 
principle I of the Privacy Act. The scope of the 
information that was sought went beyond what was 
relevant to the employer's compliance with its health and 
safety obligations or the employee 's ability to do the job. 
The Authority's determination was upheld on appeal to 
the Employment Court. 5 
Employers have a great thirst for information that is not 
necessarily caught by discrimination law. Whether or not 
the collection of particular information is "necessary" in 
terms of principle I in the employment context has in 
practice involved an assessment of its reasonab leness, and 
due allowance has been made here, as elsewhere in 
employment matters, for the exercise of managerial 
prerogative. The views of the Privacy Commissioner on a 
number of complaints indicate that non-derogable or not, 
the "necessary to collect" test in principle I involves a 
low threshold that is not difficult for an employer to 
satisfy. 
In Case No 24 I 8, f> the Privacy Commissioner found that 
personality testing of job applicants was permissible 
under the Privacy Act. The complainant had applied for a 
sa les position and was asked to complete a form 
containing 200 quest ions. She claimed that the questions 
were too personal considering the nature of the position 
sought. The Privacy Commissioner found that in terms of 
principle I, the collection of informat ion about a 
prospective employee's personality and attitudes was a 
lawful purpose connected with the employer's function. 
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He noted that other agencies used such tests, and that "the 
use of such extensive questions could probably be 
justified only in the context of obtaining the information 
as part of a comprehensive personality test to assess 
aptitude for a particular position." On the facts of the 
case, the Privacy Commissioner was unable to find that 
the test was unnecessary or that the information collected 
was excess1ve. 
The Privacy Commissioner did not address the 
intrusiveness of the test or its relevance to the particular 
position sought by the applicant. The employer, however, 
ought to have borne the burden of proving that the test 
was indeed "necessary". This case illustrates that the 
Privacy Act tends to be ineffective in substantively 
limiting the amount and extent of information collected. 
The Privacy Act is more strict, however, in relation to job 
references. This is because of the procedural obligations 
it imposes on both the collection and provision of this 
kind of personal information. Since the prospective 
employee who requests the reference is co llecting 
personal information, the principles relating to collection 
apply. In particular, the prospective employer must 
ensure that the collection of information from the referee 
has been authorised by the subject of the reference 
(principle 2). Conversely, the person who supplies the 
reference must also have the subject 's authorisation to 
disclose personal information (principle 11 ). 
Covert recording 
In New Zealand, there are few legal controls on 
surreptitious video or audio recording in the workplace --
or elsewhere for that matter. There is a prohibition against 
the carrying out of surveillance by private investigators 
without the subject 's written consent, 7 and a prohibition 
against the surreptitious use of video cameras that also 
have audio recording capabilities. 8 Although the Privacy 
Commissioner has long assumed that surrept itious 
recording is covered under the Privacy Act. 9 th is view is 
arguably mistaken. 
The Privacy Act does not limit the use of survei llance 
cameras or surrept1t1ous audio recording because 
information obtained thereby is not actually "collected" 
in terms of the Act. The term "collect" in the Privacy Act 
is defined in s 2 as excluding the "receipt of unsolicited 
information". Information obtained through surveillance 
or other forms of surreptitious recording is not solici ted 
from the subject. Video cameras, for example, are 
focused on particular physical areas and capture on film 
whatever takes place with in that space. Since what is 
captured is unsolicited, it is not "collected" in terms of 
the Privacy Act. Therefore, the various requirements and 
limitations relating to the collection of information that 
serve to promote individual autonomy cannot apply to 
surveillance techniques. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeal took this approach to the 
concept of "collecting" in Harder v Proceedings 
Commissioner, 10 which dealt with surreptitious audio 
recording. In that case, a woman rang her former 
partner's lawyer to discuss the settlement of a dispute. 
The lawyer recorded what the woman told him. The 
Tribunal that heard the woman's complaint at first 
instance found that the lawyer was collecting information 
in terms of the Privacy Act from the moment he switched 
on the tape recorder. The Court of Appeal disagreed, 
finding that the information volunteered by the woman 
was not "collected" in terms of the Act. From the 
lawyer's point of view, the information disclosed by the 
woman was unsolicited, and so in terms of Privacy Act, 
the lawyer was merely in "receipt of unsolicited 
information". The Court of Appeal majority remarked 
that "The unsolicited nature of the information was not 
affected by the fact that it was recorded or the way it was 
recorded. 
The omission of specific coverage for surveillance 
activities is consistent with the limited scope originally 
contemplated for the legislation, as indicated by the 
debates in the House of Representati ves. The chai rman of 
the subcommittee considering the original Bill remarked 
to the House that the legislation was not intended to cover 
the entire area, and stated that "snooping or prying into 
people's private affairs, whether by electronic 
eavesdropping or by entry on to private property by 
telephoto lenses or other technological devices probably 
at some time would need further consideration by the 
House.'' 11 
Although the Privacy Act principles that relate to the 
collect ion of personal information do not apply to 
surreptitious recording, the principles relating to the 
holding, use, and disclosure of personal information 
thereby obtained (principles 5 - 11 ) wi ll still apply. 
However, it is the actual collection of such information--
the fact that it is done and the manner in which it is done-
- that raises the greatest privacy objections. 
Even if surreptitious surveillance were covered under the 
Privacy Act, the legislation would be of little avail in the 
workplace, to judge by the one reported case on 
workplace surveillance where the Privacy Commiss ioner 
found it to be a permissible practice. 12 The case dealt 
with an employee's complaint about the surveillance of a 
work changing room in order to detect theft. The Privacy 
Commissioner found that the employer was not obliged to 
take reasonable steps to ensure, in accordance with 
principle 3, that the employee was aware that the 
surveillance was being undertaken. This was on the basis 
of a number of exceptions to that principle that illustrate 
its ineffectiveness for imposing any kind of control over 
su1 veillance activities. The Privacy Commissioner found 
that: 
• "it was not reasonably practicable to draw the fact of 
filming to the complainant 's attention as the video 
surveillance was intended to film covert and 
unlawful behaviour" (principle 3(4)(e)); 
( 1) " it would have prejudiced the purpose of 
collection if the complainant had been told 
that he was being filmed prior to the 
surveillance taking place" (principle 
3(4)(d)); 
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• "non-compliance with Principle 3 was necessary to 
gain sufficient evidence of theft to enable 
prosecution of an offender before a Court" (principle 
3(4)(c)(iv)). 
Moreover, the Privacy Commissioner found that the way 
the information was collected did not breach principle 4 
("Manner of collection of personal information") 
because: 
• " the use of the video camera to collect information 
was lawful; 
• the agency had taken steps to minimise the extent of 
surveillance; 
• the locker room was not a private space intended for 
the removal of clothing; 
• in the videotape viewed the complainant had only 
been recorded removing his outer clothing therefore 
this limited amount of filming without the use of 
sound was not an ·unreasonable' intrusion upon the 
complainant's personal affairs: and 
• given the need to identify the source of the stolen 
property and that the video camera was used solely 
for this purpose the covert surveillance was not 
unfair." 
In contrast to the lack of provision in the Privacy Act for 
any meaningful controls over surveil lance activities. 
employment law provides for standards of due process 
that regulate how the employer ought to conduct itse lf 
once adverse information obtained though survei llance is 
I' proposed to be used. · 
Employee bag and vehicle checks 
The Privacy Commissioner's handling of a union 
complaint concerning bag and vehicle checks il lustrates 
that the privacy principles have a minimal, but still some 
errcc t, on such pract ices. 14 The union complained that the 
~:hecks were inconsistent with the relevant employment 
contract, which provided that company personnel "shall 
not search cars, lockers, bags or any other items 
belonging to an employee without his/her consent and in 
his/her presence." The inspection policy provided that a ll 
indivit.!uals entering or leaving the site were invited to 
allow a security guard to inspect bags and vehicles. The 
security guard was only permitted to view the contents, 
not ri ne through belongings. Where there was good 
reason to suspect that a person had company property, the 
,·ehiclc or bag would be searched. The search would only 
take place ir the individual consented, in accordance with 
the employment contract. 
The company explained that its policy complied with 
health and safety leg islation, and that there was a need to 
maintain security . These concerns were based on a bomb 
threat that invo lved an evacua tion of the workplace and 
the consequent loss in production. The employer was 
advised by the police to improve its securi ty measures. 
Then~ were also concerns about drug and alcohol use 
where heavy machinery was being operated; weapons 
being brought into the workplace; and thefts of company 
property over a number of years. 
The Privacy Commissioner's investigation indicated that 
there were no longer any serious threats to the safety of 
those at the workplace. Accordingly, the company 
decided that inspections of people entering the site would 
no longer take place. The Privacy Commissioner found, 
however, that the inspection of workers leaving the site 
was necessary in terms of principle I to ensure the 
security of company and staff property. Nevertheless, the 
Privacy Commissioner formed the view that the searching 
of handbags raised concerns about the manner in which 
information was being collected (principle 4). If the 
company was particularly concerned about the theft of 
large and expensive items, such as laptops, it was not 
acceptable that handbags should be searched if such items 
could not fit in them. Otherwise, the Privacy 
Commissioner found the practice acceptable, as the 
company had notified the policy to staff and explained 
why it was implementing it, as well as the consequences 
of non-compliance. The company regarded the search 
process as voluntary, with individuals having the option 
of leaving bags and cars outside the site if they did not 
want to be searched. 
Monitoring of e-mail and internet use 
There are several New Zealand employment law cases 
dealing with employees who have been dismissed for 
inappropriate use of interne! facil ities. The Privacy Act, 
however, has not played any significant role in these 
cases. 
In the earliest case, 15 an employee was dismissed for 
allegedly harassing a female fellow staff member. The 
employer re lied, in part, upon the employee's e-mail 
correspondence with the woman as evidence for his 
misconduct. The di smissed employee sought an interim 
injunction to continue work pending the outcome of the 
case. He contended that the dismissal was improper and 
contravened the Privacy Act. The Court held that there 
was "an arguable case for procedural unfairness in this 
particular context." 16 Subsequent cases, however, have 
turned not on the Privacy Act at all , but on such factors as 
employer training and policies regarding intemet use, 17 
the nature of the use (messages containing sexual 
innuendoes and surfing the net for pornography being 
particularly frowned upon), 18 length of service, 19 and 
rights of free expression during industrial negotiations. 20 
There arc no obvious privacy rights per se in respect of 
employees' e-mai l or other interne! use, but the 
justifiability in terms of employment law of any 
disc iplinary action turns on whether the employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and the extent to 
which the employer has set clear bounds. The emphas is is 
on fairness and due process, rather than any rights 
stemming from the Privacy Act. 
Adding to the irrelevance of the Privacy Act in th is 
context is the technical issue whether an employer who 
gathers information about an employee's intemet use is 
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actually "collecting" information in terms of the Privacy 
Act. This is because the employer already holds this 
information in its computer system. The information will 
also likely to be "unsolicited" information (and so it falls 
outside the Act's definition of "collect"). Therefore, the 
rules relating to individual notification, and the 
requirement that the retention, use and disclosure of such 
information must relate to the original purpose for 
collecting it, do not apply. 
Drug and alcohol testing 
As a privacy advocate, the Privacy Commissioner has 
been at the forefront in opposing random drug testing in 
the workplace. 21 There have been no reported Privacy 
Act complaints, however, arising from drug or alcohol 
testing, and it is doubtful whether the Act could be 
invoked to limit such testing. So long as the testing is for 
a lawful purpose connected with a function or activity of 
the employer and is necessary for that purpose (principle 
I), and is carried out fairly and does not intrude 
unreasonably into the individual's personal affairs 
(principle 2), then testing could not be impugned under 
the Privacy Act. 
The permissibility of drug and alcohol testing therefore 
turns on employment law rather than on privacy law. 
Unless specifically provided for in an employment 
agreement, 22 an employer would be faced with real 
difficulties if an employee refused to submit to a test, 
particularly random testing where there is no reasonable 
cause for conducting it in the first place. The employer 
cannot physically compel the worker to undergo testing, 
and could only take disciplinary action if a refusal to be 
tested was unreasonable in the circumstances. If the 
employer decides to dismiss the worker, the issue then 
becomes whether or not the employer was substantively 
and procedurally justified in doing so. The Privacy Act 
does not provide any guidance as to what would be fair 
and reasonable in such ci rcumstances. Like employment 
law, it simply requires that any collection of personal 
information be undertaken in a fair and reasonable 
manner (principle 4 ). No new substantive rights can 
emerge from such circularity. 
In an interim injunction case where the employee sought 
reinstatement pending determination of his unjustifiable 
dismissal case/3 the Employment Court did not find 
anything amiss where drug testing was carried out in a 
procedurally fair manner and in a safety-sensitive context. 
The Privacy Act was not invoked. 
In the recent case NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing 
and Manufacturing Union /ne v Air New Zealand Ltd,24 
the Employment Court considered the application of both 
the Privacy Act as well as the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 to testing. While the issue turned on the 
application of employment law principles, the Privacy 
Act was described as "represent[ing] current community 
standards and expectations in this area." Accordingly, 
measuring an employer's conduct against the standards 
set out in the Privacy Act was said to "assist in 
determining the reasonableness of the proposed drug and 
alcohol testing. "25 
Use of biometrics 
There is one case where the Privacy Commissioner 
investigated a union complaint about the introduction of 
finger-scanning technology for an employer's payroll 
system. 26 The union claimed that a system of time sheets 
and clock cards was sufficient, and that the introduction 
of the new system, associated with criminal activity, was 
"overkill". The company, however, claimed that a 
scanner had become necessary in terms of principle I 
because of employee dishonesty in completing time 
sheets. The Privacy Commissioner found that the 
collection of information through finger-scanning was 
"necessary" for the company's purposes m the 
circumstances. 
The union also alleged that the use of finger-scanning 
technology involved an unlawful , unfair, or unreasonably 
intrusive means of collecting information (principle 4). In 
particular, the union pointed to the absence of any express 
or implied term in the employment contract requiring 
employees to consent to the physical contact involved in 
having their fingers measured by sensors. The Privacy 
Commissioner, however, did not find that the proposal 
breached principle 4, even though he declined to consider 
the contractual issue. The Privacy Commissioner held 
that this issue fell squarely wi thin the jurisdiction of the 
specialist employment law institutions, and remarked that 
" It would have been quite improper for me to usurp the 
role of the Court by dealing with the matter." Given that 
principle 4 requires that agencies not collect personal 
information "by unlawful means", the refusal to consider 
whether or not the collection of information in this case 
was going to be carried out in breach of the employees' 
contracts amounted to a concession to the employer, who 
ought to have borne the burden of proof. 
Inquiries into employee misbehaviour 
Where an employer collects information in connection 
with the investigation of employee misconduct, much 
leeway is permitted as to what is "necessary" to collect in 
such circumstances in terms of principle I. Thus, the 
predecessor body to the Human Rights Review Tribunal 
did not find any fault in a case where it was claimed that 
the employer was collecting information that was not 
necessary for the investigation of a sexual harassment 
allegation aga inst an employee. 27 The information 
concerned included information about the drinking habits 
of the employee's father and the employee's sexual 
preferences and dating habits. The Tribunal found no 
breach of principle I because the employer's inquiry was 
informal and preliminary in nature. 1t was intended 
merely to determine whether the sexual harassment 
allegation was vexatious or not. The Tribunal commented 
that "Informal inquires such as these will often elic it 
information which is irrelevant to the purpose of the 
inquiry because information wi ll be vo lunteered which 
would otherwise not be sought. " 28 
The Tribunal found that the co llection of personal 
information about the employee was necessary for the 
employer's purpose of investigating the allegation of 
sexual harassment, which the law required the employer 
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to address. The Tribunal stated that once it was satisfied 
that a collection of information was necessary fo r 
fulfilling this purpose, it could inquire no further into the 
matter, detennining which bits of information should 
have been received, and which not. 
Disclosure of personal information 
Employment law is probably just as effective as the 
Privacy Act, if not more so, in protecting employees' 
privacy interests against inappropriate disc losures by 
employers to third parties. In one employment law case, ~ 9 
the employee, a homosexual, had been inadvertently 
"outed" by his employer. The employee successfu ll y 
proved a sexual harassment grievance against hi s 
employer on the basis that others subsequently harassed 
him as a result of the disclosure. Moreover, the employee 
also succeeded in establishing his claim for unjustified 
dismissal on the basis that he had been constructi vely 
di smissed: he resigned because he had been placed in a 
highly vulnerable position by his employer. who then 
failed to mitigate the effect of the disclosure. Jn the result , 
the employee's compensatory award was exceptionally 
high by New Zealand standards. In another case, 30 the 
employee was successful in her gnevance for 
unjustifiable disadvantage because her home telephone 
number was given out in error to creditors of her 
employer without her consent. 
The one reported complaint under the Privacy Act 
concerning an employer disclosure of employee 
informat ion was resolved in the employer's favour. 31 The 
complainant alleged that management sta rted a rumour in 
the workplace that she was about to leave her 
employment. The employer acknowledged that a 
conversat ion between a manager and a supervisor was 
uwrhcard. but it was not certain whether or not this was 
the origin of the rumour. The Privacy Commissioner. 
howe' cr. found that "the nature of the information that 
was disclosed during this incident was infom1ation other 
staff members were entitled to know." He went on to 
comment that "Managers need to inform staff members 
\\'hen an employee is lea,·ing as it may have implications 
for the workload of other staff." 
Access to personal information 
Under the Privacy Act, employers have an ob ligation to 
grant individuals access. upon request, to their own 
personal inforn1ation (principle 6), unless one of the 
"good reasons fo r withholding" in the Act applies. This 
has proved to one of the most va luable aspec ts of the 
Privacy Act for workers. particularly those who wish to 
collect information about themselves from a forn1cr 
employer when contemplating legal action for 
unjustiliabk dismissa l. This right is quite useful for 
assessing \\'hether there is sufficient evidence to proceed 
against one's employer before actuall y committing 
onescl r to Clllllmencing proceedings. Thus, employees 
c:.~n sed. access to the employer's diary notes. internal 
memoranda. performance appraisa ls. details of personnel 
decis ions, and the like. 
The right of access to personal information is subject to a 
number of "good reasons" for refusing disclosure. 32 
However, only two of these "good reasons" are likely to 
arise in the ordinary employment context: these are where 
it is necessary to withhold information to protect another 
person's privacy, and where references obtained under a 
promise of confidentiality are involved. 
Procured access 
The right of access to personal information, however, is 
not without its downside for employees. Prospecti ve 
employers often require job applicants to exercise their 
access rights as a condition of being considered for 
employment. This is called "forced" or "procured" 
access. It occurs most commonly when an employer 
requires prospective employees to provide a printout of 
convictions, sometimes termed a "Police clearance", from 
the Ministry of Justice. The Teacher Registration Board 
and the Land Transport Safety Authority, for example, 
have statutory obligations to obtain this type of 
information. Many other employers are legitimately 
concerned with whether a prospective employee has been 
convicted of a crime involving dishonesty. 
Conclusion 
The balance between managerial prerogative and 
workers· privacy interests in New Zealand is largely 
determined against a backdrop of the usual dynamic of 
employer superiority. The employer's requirements tend 
to function as the "default" posi tion, so that it can 
normally rely on its right within the employment 
relationship to make its business run effectively and 
profitably. This right may allow it to do such things as 
open employee's mail, monitor e-mail communications, 
and carry out searches of desks, lockers, and bags. The 
employer will also have the right, based on the 
employee's duty of fidelity and obedience, to demand 
accountability for the employee's actions and acti vities, 
both on and off the job, where that affects a legitimate 
interest of the employer. As has been seen, privacy 
legislation in New Zealand generally tends to reinforce 
this position. With a few notable exceptions. such privacy 
rights as do exist are more likely to be enforced through 
employment law itself than under the Privacy Act. 
Where its activit ies are likely to breach the information 
privacy principles, the employer may be able to procure 
the authorisation or acquiescence of the individuals 
concerned. In practice, therefore, the information privacy 
principles do not form a very effective bar to privacy 
intrusions. Experience with the Privacy Act has shown 
that job applican ts who have failed to obta in employment 
and employees who have been dismissed tend to be the 
main beneficiaries of the rights conferred under the 
legislation. It is for this reason that privacy rights in the 
workplace need to have express protection and be non-
derogable if they are to have much potency in the 
l1 work place. ·· 
This is not to say that the Privacy Act has had little 
practical impact on employee's workplace privacy 
interests over the past decade. It appears to have 
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functioned largely ad terrorem, with employers generally 
being reticent to take bold initiatives that might fall foul 
of the Privacy Act. The possibility of incurring expense 
or loss of goodwill through the breach of untested 
legislation has acted as a powerful deterrent. In truth, 
however, the legislation 's bark is worse than its bite. 
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